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 Abstract.  We investigate the impact of large floods on civil 
conflict in a sample of 125 countries between 1985 and 2009, 
employing GDP growth as a potential transmission channel. 
We instrument for floods and control for potential spatial and 
temporal dependency of civil conflict. We find that floods in-
crease the probability of conflict incidence through their effect 
on GDP growth.  
1. Introduction 
Natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, and droughts are common 
sources of economic shocks (IMF, 2012). They can cause sub-
stantial damages and become natural disasters with profound 
environmental, political, and social consequences (Nel and 
Righarts, 2008). Previous studies have found that natural disas-
ters increase the risk of civil conflict in a country (Bergholt and 
Lujala, 2012; Drury  and Olson, 1998; Ghimire and Ferreira, 
2012; Keefer 2009; Nel and Righarts, 2008). However except 
Bergholt and Lujala (2012), previous studies do not investigate 
the potential channels through which natural disasters can 
cause civil conflict, offering little insights for policy formula-
tion.  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of large floods 
on civil conflict, using GDP growth as a potential transmission 
channel and treating the occurrence of floods as an endogenous 
variable. Except Ghimire and Ferreira (2012), all previous stu-
dies treat the natural disasters as exogenous phenomena. How-
ever, the very definition of what constitutes a natural disaster 
in those studies is based on damages, and the damages are like-
ly to be correlated with the same socioeconomic and institu-
tional variables that determine the propensity of civil conflict. 
Countries with higher income and better institutions are less 
vulnerable to natural disasters (Cavallo and Noy, 2010; 
Ferreira et al., 2011; Kahn, 2005). Ferreira and Ghimire (2012) 
find that an increase in income and improvement in institutions 
are also associated with fewer floods. Further, the emergence 
of new conflict or continuation of existing conflict could wea-
ken disasters risk reduction efforts.  
Between 1985 and 2009 floods, accounted for 40 per-
cent of all the natural disasters (CRED/OFDA, 2011).The 
IPCC (2001, 2007, 2012) predicts that climate change can lead 
to change in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, 
and timing of extreme weather and climate events and can re-
sult in unprecedented extreme weather and climate events. 
Brakenridge (2011) documents floods that are becoming larger 
and more frequent over the last 25 years. These events, inte-
racting with exposed and vulnerable human and natural  
systems, can lead to disasters with profound environmental, 
political, and social consequences (Nel and Righarts, 2008).  
Civil conflict is one of the greatest tragedies in human 
civilization. It impacts negatively on economic development 
and political stability. It is estimated that civil conflicts have 
resulted deaths of 20 million people and caused 67 million 
people to become refugees (Doyle and Sambanis, 2003). In this 
regard, identifying the potential transmission channel is impor-
tant to formulate policies to mitigate negative impacts of large, 
catastrophic floods on broad social outcomes. 
2. Natural disasters, economic growth, and civil conflict 
The economic effects of natural disasters vary widely depend-
ing on the country and the type of disaster. Countries with fa-
vorable socioeconomic characteristics and institutions appear 
to be less vulnerable to natural disasters (Cavallo and Noy, 
2010; Ferreira and Ghimire, 2012; Ferreira et al., 2011; Kahn, 
2005; Noy, 2009). In some studies, natural disasters have been 
found to be a positive force for economic growth particularly 
in developed economies.1 In addition, the arrival of resources 
for reconstruction may provide a short-run boost to the affected 
regions.  
Disasters, however, tend to be disastrous in poor 
countries. For example, Haiti’s economy has shrunk more than 
eight percent since the 2011 earthquake (Surowiecki, 2011). In 
Pakistan, the 2011 floods appear to have reduced GDP growth 
by about 2 percentage points in 2011 (Looney, 2012). A typi-
cal hurricane that strikes in the central American and Carib-
bean region causes a reduction in annual output growth of 
about one percentage point (Strobl, 2008).  
Contrary to droughts, hurricanes, and earthquakes, 
some studies find a positive macroeconomic impact of floods 
in long run, arguably through increased agricultural production 
and productivity that spills over to the rest of the economy 
(Fomby et al., 2011; Loyza. et al., 2009). However, in the 
short run large floods, like other natural disasters hit the econ-
omy and result into a decline in GDP growth. As argued by 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), a low income or economic 
growth decrease the opportunity costs of young men to engage 
in conflict. The lower economic opportunities can result into 
frustration and grievances, making it possible to recruit rebels 
at modest compensation levels.   
                                                 
1 An argument often made for the limited macroeconomic impact of natural 
disasters in developed countries is that disasters may be speeding up a Schum-
peterian “creative destruction” process: by destroying old infrastructures, such 
as factories, roads, airports, and bridges, the disasters allow new and more 
efficient infrastructures to be built, forcing the transition to a sleeker, more 
productive economy in the long run (Skidmore and Toya, 2002). 
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Some socioeconomic characteristics such as high 
population density, youth bulges, natural resource dependence, 
and ethnic tensions are thought to provide suitable environ-
ments to breed conflict. Democratic institutions can reduce the 
risk of civil unrests (DeNardo, 1985; Francisco, 1995; Hegre et 
al., 2001). Other characteristics, such as rough terrain (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004), and unrest in neighboring countries 
(Alcock, 1972) can also create a suitable environment for 
rebels to engage in civil unrest.  
 Although grievances may not be suffice to explain 
civil unrest,  the grievances and competition for resources, 
combined with lack of representative institutions, economic 
redistribution mechanisms, and poor state capacity to deter 
violence, are a more likely explanation for civil unrest in the 
aftermath of large, catastrophic disasters (Gleditsch et al., 
2007).   
3. Data 
We compiled data on civil conflict, large floods, and a set of 
socioeconomic, political, and geophysical country characteris-
tics and temporal-spatial controls for a total of 125 countries 
between 1985 and 2009 that are listed in the UPPSALA/PRIO 
civil conflict dataset.    
3.1 Civil conflict data 
We use civil conflict data from the annually updated UPPSA-
LA/PRIO civil conflict dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér and 
Wallensteen, 2012). It defines civil conflict as “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which 
one is the government of state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths.” The dataset is very selective, including only 
politically motivated violence. In addition, it has a relatively 
low inclusion criterion (25 battle-related deaths during a year). 
The dataset is event-based, recording conflict events for a giv-
en country in a year. We make it annual by aggregating mul-
tiple events within a country-year. We use two indicators for 
civil conflict: 
Onset of civil conflict: coded one when a new conflict emerges, 
there has been a total change in the opposite side, or when a 
conflict that has been inactive for more than two calendar years 
and becomes active again, and zero otherwise. In total, our 
dataset includes 97 onsets out of 2576 observations (4%).  
Incidence of civil conflict: coded one if there are any types of 
conflict (new or existing conflicts) in a country-year, and zero 
otherwise. We have a total of 491 incidences out of 2576 ob-
servations (19%).  
3.2 Flood data 
Flood data come from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory 
(DFO) (Brakenridge, 2011), a publicly accessible global arc-
hive of large flood events, housed at the University of Colora-
do (http://floodobservatory.colorado.edu/). For a flood event to 
be considered ‘large’ and recorded in the dataset, it has to ful-
fill at least one of the following criteria: significant damage to 
structures, or agriculture, long reported intervals (decades) 
since the last similar event, and/or fatalities (Brakenridge, 
2011). 
 The DFO records the flood data on the basis of coun-
try-event. We converted them to country-year observations by 
adding the number of flood events, and physical impacts of all 
flood events (magnitude) within a year for a given country. We 
code flood frequency zero if there are no floods reported in a 
country-year. Otherwise, we set it equal to sum of reported 
events in a country-year.  
 In addition to the number of floods, the DFO reports 
magnitude of each flood event as log (duration × severity × 
affected area). We code magnitude as zero if no floods were 
reported for a country-year. Otherwise, we compute total mag-
nitude as the sum of the reported events' magnitude in a coun-
try-year.  
  Since we measure GDP growth in an annual basis, we 
need to adjust for the timing of flooding; a flood that hits 
economy in January will have a bigger impact on GDP in the 
same year than a flood that hits in December (Bergholt and 
Lujala, 2012; Noy, 2009). We adjust for this taking into ac-






=                    (1) 
 If a country has experienced several flood events dur-
ing a year, the individual values are aggregated. The frequency 
of floods in our sample ranges from zero to 19 with nearly half 
flood event between 1985 and 2009 per country-year (standard 
deviation = 1.3). The magnitude ranges from zero to 161, with 
an average 3 per country-year (standard deviation = 8.3) (Table 
1).    
3.3 Other controls 
We use GDP growth as the potential transmission channel be-
tween floods and civil conflict. In addition, per previous litera-
ture, we control for a range of socioeconomic, institutional, 
and geophysical country characteristics. We use per capita 
income to account for the opportunity cost of rebels to engage 
in civil conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Other socioeco-
nomic controls are population density, youth population, oil 
rents, infant mortality as a proxy for economic inequality, and 
ethnic tensions. Data for population density and infant mortali-
ty come from WDI (2010), youth population from WDI (2010) 
and United Nations (2010), oil rents from the World Bank 
(2010), and ethnic tensions from PRS (2011).  
 To control for political institutions, we use polity2 
and polity2 square from the Polity2 regime indicators prepared 
by Marshall and Jaggers (2011), with the variables ranging 
from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
We control for regime instability as per Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) by creating a instability dummy with value one if there 
are three or more change in polity2 regime indicator over the 
last 3 years.  
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 Because of the panel nature of UPPSALA/PRIO civil 
conflict data, we control for temporal dependency in the onsets 
equation. We construct a ‘brevity of peace’ variable as per 
Hegre et al. (2001), Toset et al. (2000), Nel and Righarts 
(2008), and Urdal (2006). We control for spatial dependency 
with a ‘conflict in neighboring country’ variable, that equals 
one if there is conflict in a neighboring country-year and zero 
otherwise. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (country=125, observation=2576) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Flood frequency 0.545 1.392 0 19 
Flood magnitude 2.930 8.371 0 161.089 
Onset  0.035 0.186 0 1 
Incidence  0.181 0.385 0 1 
GDP growth (%) 3.719 5.603 -51.030 106.279 
GDP/capita 10969.88 12510.76 140.019 77108.22 
Infant mortality 41.584 37.134 2.1 167.2 
Youth population (%) 18.046 2.974 0.0481 26.105 
Population density 148.373 537.276 1.312 7125.143 
Oil rents 0.172 0.377 0 1 
Ethnic tensions 3.939 1.428 0 6 
Instability  0.111 0.314 0 1 
Polity2   3.267 6.921 -10 10 
Country area 992031 2185520 670 1.64E+07 
Terrain ruggedness 0.626 0.410 0.004 2.197 
Brevity of peace 0.236 0.391 0 1 
Conflict in neigh. country 0.484 0.499 0 1 
Coastal proximity 40.639 36.544 0 100 
Variation in precipitation  61.002 50.009 0.862 391.151 
 We control for geophysical characteristics, such as 
terrain ruggedness and country area as addition covariates. 
Terrain ruggedness data comes from from Nunn and Puga 
(2010) and country area data from WDI (2010).  
We instrument for floods using precipitation data 
(monthly variation in precipitation in mm) collected from 
TCCCR (2011); and coastal proximity (percentage of country’s 
land area within 100 km of ice-free coast) from Nunn and Puja 
(2012).  Summary statistics of all the variables are provided in 
Table 1. The table shows that there are much variations in in-
dicators for conflict and floods across countries.   
 4. Estimation strategy  
We assume that floods are a negative shock to GDP growth, 
and that shock contributes to worsen socioeconomic conditions 
increasing the risk of civil conflict. Not only floods, but also 
GDP growth is likely to be endogenous. We correct for endo-
geneity of floods and GDP growth in our model using a three 
step estimation procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the 
reduced form equation for floods (Floodit), in the second stage 
we estimate the reduced form equation for GDP growth 
(GDPGit), and finally we estimate the structural equation for 
conflict risk (Conflictit). The system of equations can be sum-
marized as: 
,Flood f ( )it = X it -1 Z        (2)  
,GDPG g( Flood )it = X it -1it -1     (3) 
,Conflict h( GDPG )it it= X it -1     (4) 
where Flood is an indicator for large floods (flood frequency, 
or magnitude adjusted by timing of flooding as in equation 1);  
X is a vector of controls that includes socioeconomic indicators 
– infant mortality rate, GDP per capita, youth population, pop-
ulation density, oil-rents (=1), ethnic tensions; political institu-
tions – polity2,  polity2 square, and instability (=1); geophysi-
cal characteristics – country area and terrain ruggedness; spa-
tial-temporal controls – conflict in neighboring countries (=1), 
and brevity of peace;  Z is a vector of instruments for floods 
that includes precipitation (monthly variation in precipitation) 
and costal proximity; GDPG is GDP growth; and Conflict is an 
indicator of civil conflict (either onset, or incidence).    
  The instruments used for floods are relevant as shown 
in the reduced form equations for floods (Table 2). We believe 
that they satisfy the exclusion restriction; precipitation and 
coastal proximity affect GDP growth through floods. We re-
gressed GDP growth on monthly variation in precipitation with 
and without controls and found that precipitation was not a 
statistically significant determinant of either GDP growth, or 
conflict risk (onset and incidence). Further, coastal proximity 
does not directly affect either GDP growth, or civil conflict.  
  Civil conflict does not always follow immediately 
after the occurrence of natural disasters (De Boer and Sanders, 
2004; De Boer and Sanders, 2005; Drury and Olson, 1998). 
We lagged the flood variables (frequency and magnitude) one 
period to accommodate the potential lagged effects. We also 
analyzed the robustness of the results to using alternative indi-
cators for flood occurrence - magnitude of floods. In all the 
specifications, all explanatory variables are lagged one period 
to mitigate potential endogeneity bias. All the regressions in-
clude year dummies to control for year specific effects.    
Econometric methods 
We follow a three-step estimation procedure to estimate the 
model. In the first step we estimate equation (2) and then equa-
tion (3), both using a random effects model, and then we esti-
mate two versions of equation (4) (one for conflict onset and 
another one for incidence) using a random effects logit model.  
  Instead of random effects, we could have used fixed 
effects to estimate the onset and incidence model, but Haus-
man tests favored it random effects (p=0.8729). Further, the 
use of fixed effects in non-linear models is generally inconsis-
tent when the length of the panel is fixed and appears to be 
biased in finite samples (Greene, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002).  
Moreover, the use of fixed effects in our study drops a substan-
tial number of observations from the sample; from 125 to 44 
countries and from 2576 country-year pairs (observations) to 
only 959. It drops all the countries for which there is no varia-
tion in the dependent variable (e.g. because they did not expe-
rience any civil conflict, or they experienced civil conflict dur-
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ing the whole sample period). In this case, this country’s con-
tribution to the log-likelihood is zero and as such it has no ef-
fect on the estimation (Beck and Katz, 2001).     
5. Results 
After estimating the reduced form equation for floods (Table 
2), we estimated 2 different versions of equations 2 and 3 de-
pending on the dependent variables - conflict onset and conflict 
incidence. We summarize their average marginal effects 
(AMEs) in the last four columns of Table 2.   
5. 1 Floods, GDP growth, and onset of civil conflict  
In the reduced form equation for GDP growth (col. 3), the 
coefficient of the flood variable is negative and significant at a  
5 percent level, implying that floods are a negative shock to 
GDP growth, with one additional flood lowering GDP growth 
in the next period by about 2 percent. The variables population 
density, country area, terrain ruggedness, and conflict in 
neighboring countries are also statistically significant determi-
nants of GDP growth.  










Floods   -2.175**   -2.313**  
 (0.993)   (1.018)  
GDP growth   -0.012  -0.037* 
  (0.012)  (0.022)
Ln(GDP/capita) 0.326*** -0.413  -0.016 -0.430 -0.020 
(0.084) (0.478) (0 .016) (0.430) (0.038) 
Ln(infant mortality) 0.366*** -0.272 0.003 -0.230 0.046 
(0.106) (0.602) (0.015) (0.528) (0.055) 
Youth population  -0.038** 0.131  0.000 0.117 0.013 
(0.015) (0.111) (0 .003)  (0.108) (0.014) 
Ln(pop. density) 0.346*** 1.036** 0.014*  1.073*** 0.096*** 
(0.065) (0.408) (0.011) (0 .413)  (0.029) 
Oil rents -0.378** 0.301 0.041* 0.279  0.084 
(0.119) (0.683) (0.029) (0.616) (0.059) 
Ethnic tensions  -0.038 0.224  -0.001 0 .241  -0.020* 
(0.022) (0.182) (0.004) (0.193) (0.011) 
Instability  0.208** 0.221  -0.009 0.230 0.014 
(0.063) (0.574) (0.009) (0.590)  (0.017) 
Polity2  0.010 0.039 0.000 0.047  -0.000 
(0.007) 0.053  (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) 
Ln(country area) 0.546*** 0.921** 0.007 0.974* 0.057*** 
(0.053) (0.463) (0.006) (0.497) (0.021) 
Terrain ruggedness  -0.074 -0.716*  -0.004  -0.736* 0.050 
(0.169) (0.435) (0.013) (0.443) (0.048) 
Conflict in neigh. -0.063 0.848** 0.024* 0.857***  0.037 
(0.057) (0.359)  (0.019) (0.323) (0.030) 
Brevity of peace 0.107 -0.114 -0.012   
(0.084) (0.499) (0.016)   
Ln(precipitation) 0.147***     
(0.058)     
Costal proximity 0.005**     
(0.002)     
Observations 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 
Number of id 125 125 125 125 125 
Note: Random effects model for reduced form equations and random effects logit model for 
structural equations. Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 In the conflict onsets equation (col. 4), GDP growth 
has a negative coefficient, indicating that it decreases the prob-
ability of conflict onset, but the result is weak statistically (the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at the conventional 
levels). In contrast, population density, oil rents, and conflict in 
neighboring countries are all positive and statistically signifi-
cant at 10 percent level or better. The marginal effects indicate 
that a one percent increase in population density increases the 
probability of conflict onset by about 1.5 percent. Countries 
with oil rents have a 4 percent greater probability of conflict 
onset than those without oil rents. Having civil unrest in neigh-
boring countries positively and significantly increases the risk 
of conflict onset in adjacent countries by about 2.5 percent. 
The variables GDP per-capita, infant mortality, youth popula-
tion, ethnic tensions, polity2, and country area all have the 
anticipated sign, but they are statistically insignificant. 
5.2 Flood, GDP growth, and incidence of civil conflict  
As shown in the reduced form equation for GDP growth (col. 
5), the coefficient of the flood variable is negative and signifi-
cant at a 5 percent level, implying that floods are a negative 
shock to GDP growth, with one additional flood lowering GDP 
growth by 2.3 percent for the average country in the next year. 
The variables population density, country area, terrain rugged-
ness, and conflict in neighboring countries are again statistical-
ly significant determinants of GDP growth.  
Table 3: Flood, GDP growth, and civil conflict with alternative indica-
tors for floods (AMEs) (1985-2009) 
 Conflict onset Conflict incidence 
VARIABLES GDP 
growth 
Onset  GDP 
growth 
Incidence 
     
Floods  -0.309*  -0.337*  
 (0.192)  (0.187)  
GDP growth   -0.020   -0.045* 
  (0.017)  (0.031 
Ln(GDP/capita) -0.766 -0.023 -0.806* -0.029 
 (0.473)  (0.020) (0.457) (0.047) 
Ln(infant mortality) -0.735  -0.003 -0.713 0.037 
 (0.526) (0.017) (0.508) (0.066) 
Youth population  0.169* 0.002 0.154 0.015 
 (0.098) (0.003) (0.098) (0.014) 
Ln(pop. density) 0.911**  0.015* 0.951** 0.097*** 
 (0.464) (0.010) (0.453) (0.027) 
Oil rents 0.829 0.049* 0.837 0.097 
 (0.700)  (0.031) (0.688) (0.072) 
Ethnic tensions  0.228 0 .000 0.250  -0.017 
 (0.183) (0.004) (0.179) (0.013) 
Instability  0.146  -0.009 0.154 0.014 
 (0.542) (0.010) (0.563)  (0.016) 
Polity2  .0195  0.000 0.029 -0.000 
  .0538 (0.000)  (0.055)  (0.001) 
Ln(country area) 0.731 0 .006 0.786 0.055** 
 (0.519) (0 .006) (0.513) (0.020) 
Terrain ruggedness -0.704  -0.008 -0.736  0.044 
 (0.474) (0.011) (0.470) (0.047) 
Conflict in neigh. 0.883** 0.0325* 0.891*** 0.047 
 (0.348) (0.015) (0.336) (0.038) 
Brevity of peace -0.224  -0.015   
 (0.570) (0.016)   
Observations 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 
Number of id 125 125 125 125 
Note: Random effects model for reduced form equations and random effects logit 
model for structural equations. Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses.              
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In the incidence equation (col. 6), the coefficient on 
GDP growth is negative, implying that a decline in GDP 
growth increases the probability of conflict incidence, and this 
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effect is statistically significant. A one percent decrease in 
GDP growth increases the probability of incidence of civil 
conflict by 3.7 percent. 
 Results also show that a one percent increase in popu-
lation density is associated with a 9.5 percent greater risk of 
conflict incidence. One unit improvement in ethnic tensions 
lowers the probability of conflict incidence by 2 percent. The 
variables GDP/capita, infant mortality, youth population, oil 
rents, instability, polity2, terrain ruggedness, and conflict in 
neighboring countries have the expected signs, but the results 
are weak statistically.    
5.3 Robustness of results to alternative flood indicator 
In Table 3, we use magnitude of floods as an alternative indi-
cator of flood occurrence. As with flood frequency, we also 
adjusted for the timing of flood onset and instrumented for the 
flood magnitude variable using precipitation and coastal prox-
imity. The results are similar to the baseline specifications; 
flood variable is statistically significant with a negative sign in 
the reduced form equations for GDP growth and GDP growth 
has a negative sign in both equations but is statistically signifi-
cant only in the incidence equation. The controls are signifi-
cant as per the baseline specifications.  
6. Discussion and conclusion  
Since one addition flood lowers GDP growth by about 2 per-
cent and one percent reduction in GDP growth increases the 
probability of conflict incidence by about 4 percent, the com-
bined effect, or the effect of one additional flood on conflict 
incidence is about a 2.3 × 3.7 ≈ 8.5 percent larger probability 
of conflict incidence. With reference to our sample, the aver-
age country experienced approximately 0.54 flood event per 
year, which is associated with a 1.25 reduction in their GDP 
growth and results into 3.70 × 1.25 ≈ 4.63 percent larger prob-
ability of conflict incidence. That is, the average country in our 
sample experienced a 4.63 percent larger risk of conflict inci-
dence because of flooding.  
 The estimated impact of floods on GDP growth is 
large. However, case studies find that the estimated impacts 
could be much larger. For example, Pakistan experienced a 2 
percentage point reduction in GDP growth after the 2010 mas-
sive inundations, which is equivalent to a 50 percent decline in 
GDP growth (Looney, 2012). Likewise, the 2011 October’s 
deluge in Thailand lowered GDP growth by one percentage 
point, equivalent to 12 percent reduction in GDP growth in 
2011 (Xinhua, 2011).  
 The slowdown in GDP growth could have huge socio, 
political impacts. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Pakis-
tani Taliban capitalized the frustration and grievance to streng-
then their presence in the Northwest region, which was the 
most affected area by the flooding and also an epicenter of 
Pakistan’s fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban (CBSNews, 
2010; Righarts, 2010). However, there are few studies that 
analyze the impact of large, catastrophic disasters on broad 
social outcomes. Our work is a small effort to understand the 
potential impacts of large, catastrophic floods on GDP growth 
and on civil conflict.    
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